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Oakland, California -- Protesting raids at a local 
hotel.
Introduction
A political alliance is developing between countries with a labor export policy and the corporations 
who use that labor in the global north. Many countries sending migrants to the developed world 
depend on remittances to finance social services and keep the lid on social discontent over poverty 
and joblessness, while continuing to make huge debt payments.  Corporations using that displaced 
labor share a growing interest with those countries’ governments in regulating the system that 
supplies it. 
Increasingly, the mechanisms for regulating that flow of people are contract labor programs—called 
“guest worker” or “temporary worker” programs in the U.S., or “managed migration” in the UK and 
much of the EU. With or without these programs, migration to the U.S. and other industrial countries 
is a fact of life.  Despite often using rhetoric that demonizes immigrants, the U.S. Congress is not 
debating the means for ending migration.  Nothing can, short of a radical reordering of the world’s 
economy. 
Nor are the current waves of immigration raids and deportations in the U.S. intended to halt it.  In 
an economy in which immigrant labor plays a critical part, the price of stopping migration would be 
economic crisis. The intent of immigration policy is managing the flow of people, determining their 
status here in the U.S., in the interest of those who put that labor to work.
Migrants are human beings first however, and their desire for community is as strong as the need 
to labor.  The use of neoliberal reforms and economic treaties to displace communities, to produce 
a global army of available and vulnerable workers, has a brutal impact. Existing and proposed free 
trade agreements between the U.S. and Mexico, Canada, Central America, Peru, Colombia, Panama, 
South Korea, and Jordan not only do not stop the economic transformations that uproot families and 
throw them into the migrant stream—they push that whole process forward.
On a world scale, the migratory flow caused by displacement is still generally self-initiated. In other 
words, while people may be driven by forces beyond their control, they move at their own will 
and discretion, trying to find survival and economic opportunity, and to reunite their families and 
create new communities in the countries they now call home.  But the idea of managing the flow of 
migration is growing. 
It is the contention of this paper that these global economic forces are driving the development of 
U.S. immigration policy.  Increasingly, the political fault lines that divide the U.S. immigrant rights 
movement are determined by decisions to either support this general trend in policy, and its political 
representatives in Washington DC, or to oppose it and create a social movement for equality and 
rights based in the communities of migrants themselves.
The development of a labor supply and labor management system to govern the flow of migrants, 
that is, of people, requires increasingly ferocious enforcement.  With the criminalization of work 
for undocumented migrants a quarter century ago, along with the resurrection of a contract labor 
program for migrants, in the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, the parameters were 
set for the debates over immigration policy that continue to the present.  Today immigration raids 
and enforcement actions, harsh and racist legislation, and the hysteria that comes with all this, are 
sweeping our country. Today’s migrants have become needed low-wage labor and criminals at the 
same time. 
This paper will outline first the global economic forces driving displacement and migration, and their 
impact on communities.  It will then outline the basic structure and purpose of U.S. immigration 
policy, and the basic proposals for changing it.  It will examine the division between mainstream, 
Washington DC-based supporters of corporate immigration reform and community- and labor-based 
groups who call for an alternative, and finally it will outline their proposals for an alternative based 
on human and labor rights.  
We begin with the examination of one particular stream of migrants, of indigenous people from 
Oaxaca, both because their experience is similar to others, but also because organizations in the 
communities involved have articulated a sophisticated analysis of the system in which they move.
Postville, Iowa - Maria Rosala 
Mejia Marroquin, a Guatemalan 
immigrant, was arrested in an 
immigration raid at the Agripro-
cessors meatpacking plant in 
Postville. She was released 
to care for her child, but had 
to wear an ankle bracelet to 
monitor her movements.  She 
could not work or travel, and 
was eventually deported.
Where the Flow of People Begins
Rufino Domínguez, the former coordinator of the Binational Front of Indigenous Organizations, 
who now heads the Oaxacan Institute for Attention to Migrants, estimates there are about 500,000 
indigenous people from Oaxaca living in the U.S., 300,000 in California alone. 
According to Rick Mines, author of the 2010 Indigenous Farm Worker Study, “the total population 
of California’s indigenous Mexican farm workers is about 120,000 ... a total of 165,000 indigenous 
farm workers and family members in California.”   Counting the many indigenous people living and 
working in urban areas, the total is considerably higher, he says, easily meeting Domínguez’ estimate. 
The study counted 54,000 people who had emigrated from 350 Oaxacan towns, or about 150 per 
town.  Given the size of many small communities, this supports the widespread assertion of many 
indigenous Oaxacans that some towns have become depopulated, or are communities of the very old 
and very young, where most working-age people have left to work in the north.
“In the early 1990s there were about 35,000 indigenous farm workers in California,” Mines says, 
“while in the 2004 to 2008 period there were about four times as many, or 120,000 indigenous Mexican 
farm workers.”  In addition, indigenous people made up 7% of Mexican migrants in 1991-3, the years 
just before the passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement.  In 2006-8 they made up 29% 
-- four times more.  
California has a farm labor force of about 700,000 workers, so the day is not far off when indigenous 
Oaxacan migrants may make up a majority.  They are truly the workforce that has been produced 
by NAFTA and the neoliberal changes in the global economy.  Further, “the U.S. food system has 
long been dependent on the influx of an ever-changing, newly-arrived group of workers that sets 
the wages and working conditions at the entry level in the farm labor market,” Mines says.  The 
rock-bottom wages paid to this most recent wave of migrants – Oaxaca’s indigenous people – sets 
the wage floor for all the other workers in California farm labor, keeping the labor cost of California 
growers low, and their profits high.
Economic crises provoked by the North American Free Trade Agreement and other economic reforms 
are now uprooting and displacing these Mexicans in the country’s most remote areas, where people 
still speak languages that were old when Columbus arrived from Spain.  While farm workers 20 and 
30 years ago came from parts of central Mexico with a larger Spanish presence, migrants today come 
increasingly from indigenous communities.  “There are no jobs, and NAFTA forced the price of corn 
so low that it’s not economically possible to plant a crop anymore,” Dominguez says.  “We come to 
the U.S. to work because we can’t get a price for our product at home.  There’s no alternative.”   
As he points out, U.S. trade and immigration policy are linked together.  They are part of a single 
system, not separate and independent policies.   The negotiation of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement was in fact an important step in the development of this relationship.
Since NAFTA’s passage in 1993, the U.S. Congress has debated and passed several new trade 
agreements – with Peru, Jordan, Chile, and the Central American Free Trade Agreement.  At the 
same time it has debated immigration policy as though those trade agreements bore no relationship 
to the waves of displaced people migrating to the U.S., looking for work.  Meanwhile, a rising tide 
of anti-immigrant hysteria has increasingly demonized those migrants, leading to measures to deny 
them jobs, rights, or any pretense of equality with people living in the communities around them.  To 
resolve any of these dilemmas, from adopting rational and humane immigration policies to reducing 
the fear and hostility towards migrants, the starting point must be an examination of the way U.S. 
policies have both produced migration, and criminalized migrants.
Santiago Juxtlahuaca, Oaxaca, Mexico -- Zacarias 
Salazar plows a cornfield with an ox.
The Immigration Reform and Control Act 
and NAFTA
Trade negotiations and immigration policy were formally joined together when Congress passed 
the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) in 1986.  Immigrant rights activists campaigned 
against the law because it contained employer sanctions, prohibiting employers for the first time on 
a federal level from hiring undocumented workers.  Those advocates said the proposal amounted to 
criminalizing work for the undocumented.  IRCA’s liberal defenders pointed to its amnesty provision 
as a gain that justified sanctions, and the bill eventually did enable over 4 million people living in 
the U.S. without immigration documents to gain permanent residence. Showing the broad bipartisan 
consensus for the bill’s approach to immigration in Washington DC, the bill was signed into law by 
Ronald Reagan, a Republican and the country’s most conservative president up to that time.
 
Few noted one other provision of the law.  IRCA set up a Commission for the Study of International 
Migration and Cooperative Economic Development to study the causes of immigration to the U.S.  
The commission was inactive until 1988, but began holding hearings when the U.S. and Canada 
signed a bilateral free trade agreement.  After Mexican President Carlos Salinas de Gortari made it 
plain he favored a similar agreement with Mexico, the commission made a report to President George 
Bush Sr. and to Congress in 1990.  It found, unsurprisingly, that the main motivation for coming to 
the U.S. was economic.  To slow or halt this flow, it recommended “promoting greater economic 
integration between the migrant sending countries and the United States through free trade” and that 
“U. S. economic policy should promote a system of open trade.”  It concluded that “the United States 
should expedite the development of a U.S.-Mexico free trade area and encourage its incorporation 
with Canada into a North American free trade area,” while warning that “it takes many years – even 
generations – for sustained growth to achieve the desired effect.”  
The negotiations that led to NAFTA started within months of the report.  As Congress debated 
the treaty, Mexican President Carlos Salinas de Gortari toured the United States, telling audiences 
unhappy at high levels of immigration that passing NAFTA would reduce it by providing 
employment for Mexicans in Mexico.  Back home Salinas and other treaty proponents made the same 
argument.  NAFTA, they claimed, would set Mexico on a course to become a first-world nation.  
“We did become part of the first world,” says Juan Manuel Sandoval, coordinator of the Permanent 
Seminario on Chicano and Border Studies at Mexico City’s National Institute of Anthropology and 
History.  “The back yard.”
NAFTA, however, did not lead to rising incomes and employment, and therefore, it did not decrease 
the flow of migrants to the U.S.  Instead, it became an important source of pressure on Mexicans, 
particularly Oaxacans, to migrate.  The treaty forced yellow corn grown by Mexican farmers without 
subsidies to compete in Mexico’s own market with corn from huge U.S. producers, subsidized by the 
U.S. farm bill.  Agricultural exports to Mexico more than doubled during the NAFTA years, from $4.6 
to $9.8 billion annually – $2.5 billion in 2006 in corn alone.  In January and February of 2008, huge 
demonstrations in Mexico sought to block the implementation of the agreement’s final chapter, which 
lowered the tariff barriers on white corn and beans.  
As a result of a growing crisis in agricultural production, by the 1980s Mexico had already become 
a corn importer.  Corn imports rose from 2,014,000 to 10,330,000 tons from 1992 to 2008.  According 
to Alejandro Ramírez, general director of the Confederation of Mexican Pork Producers, Mexico 
imported 30,000 tons of pork in 1995, the year NAFTA took effect.  By 2010 pork imports, almost all 
from the U.S., had grown over 25 times, to 811, 000 tons.  As a result, pork prices received by Mexican 
producers dropped 56%. 
Imports had a dramatic effect on Mexican jobs.  “We lost 4000 pig farms,” Alejandro Ramírez 
estimates.  “On Mexican farms, each 100 animals produce 5 jobs, so we lost 20,000 farm jobs directly 
from imports.  Counting the 5 indirect jobs dependent on each direct job, we lost over 120,000 jobs in 
total.  This produces migration to the U.S. or to Mexican cities -- a big problem for our country.”  Once 
Mexican meat and corn producers were driven from the market by imports, the Mexican economy 
was left vulnerable to price changes dictated by U.S. agribusiness or U.S. policy.  “When the U.S. 
modified its corn policy to encourage ethanol production,” he charges, “corn prices jumped 100% in 
one year.”   
NAFTA then prohibited price supports, without which hundreds of thousands of small farmers found 
it impossible to sell corn or other farm products for what it cost to produce them.  The CONASUPO 
system, in which the Mexican government bought corn at subsidized prices, turned it into tortillas 
and sold them in state-franchised grocery stores at subsidized low prices, was abolished.  
 
Mexico couldn’t protect its own agriculture from the fluctuations of the world market.  A global coffee 
glut in the 1990s plunged prices below the cost of production.  A less entrapped government might 
have bought the crops of Veracruz farmers to keep them afloat, or provided subsidies for other crops.  
But once free market structures were in place prohibiting government intervention to help them, 
those farmers paid the price.  Veracruz campesinos joined the stream of workers headed north.  There 
they became an important part of the workforce in the Smithfield pork processing plant in North 
Carolina, as well as in other industries.
  
U.S. companies were allowed to own land and factories, eventually anywhere in Mexico, without 
Mexican partners.  U.S.-based Union Pacific, in partnership with the Larrea family, became the owner 
of the country’s main north-south rail line, and immediately discontinued virtually all passenger 
service, as railroad corporations had done in the US.  Mexican rail employment dropped from over 
90,000 to 36,000.  Facing privatization, railroad workers mounted a wildcat strike to try to save their 
jobs, but they lost and their union became a shadow of its former presence in Mexican politics.
 
Slashing wages in privatized enterprises and gutting union agreements only increased the wage 
differential between the U.S. and Mexico.  According to Garrett Brown of the Maquiladora Health 
and Safety Network, the average Mexican wage was 23% of the U.S. manufacturing wage in 1975.  
By 2002 it was less than an eighth, according to Mexican economist, and former Senator Rosa Albina 
Garabito.  Brown says that since NAFTA went into effect, real Mexican wages dropped by 22%, while 
worker productivity increased 45%.
Low wages are the magnet used to attract US and other foreign investors.  In mid-June, 2006, Ford 
Corporation, already one of Mexico’s largest employers, announced it would invest $9 billion more 
in building new factories.  Meanwhile, Ford said it was closing at least 14 US plants, eliminating the 
jobs of tens of thousands of U.S. workers. Both moves were part of the company’s strategic plan to 
stem losses by cutting labor costs drastically and moving production.  When General Motors was 
bailed out by the U.S. government in the current recession, it closed a dozen U.S. plants and laid off 
tens of thousands of workers.  Its plans for building new plants in Mexico went forward without any 
hindrance.
In NAFTA’s first year, 1994,  one million Mexicans lost their jobs, by the government’s count, when 
the peso was devalued.  To avert the sell off of short-term bonds and a flood of capital to the north. 
U.S. Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin engineered a $20 billion loan to Mexico, which was paid to 
bondholders, mostly US banks.  In return, U.S. and British banks gained control of the country’s 
financial system.  Mexico had to pledge its oil revenue to pay off foreign debt, making the country’s 
primary source of income unavailable for social needs.
As the Mexican economy, especially the border maquiladora industry, became increasingly tied to the 
U.S. market, Mexican workers lost jobs when the market for what those factories produced shrank 
during U.S. recessions.  In 2000-2001 400,000 jobs were lost on the U.S./Mexico border, and in the 
current recession, thousands more have been eliminated. 
Monterrey, Mexico -- La Alianza 
barrio, a community of displaced 
people, who work in maquiladoras.
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Displacement – a Product of Free Market Reforms
All of these policies produced displaced people, who could no longer make a living or survive as 
they’d done before.  The rosy predictions of NAFTA’s boosters that it would raise income and  slow 
migration proved false.  The World Bank, in a 2005 study made for the Mexican government, found 
that the extreme rural poverty rate of 35% in 1992-4, prior to NAFTA, jumped to 55% in 1996-8, after 
NAFTA took effect.  This could be explained, the report said, “mainly by the 1995 economic crisis, the 
sluggish performance of agriculture, stagnant rural wages, and falling real agricultural prices.”
 
By 2010 53 million Mexicans were living in poverty, according to the Monterrey Institute of 
Technology -- half the country’s population.  About 20% live in extreme poverty, almost all in rural 
areas.  The growth of poverty, in turn, fueled migration.  In 1990 4.5 million Mexican-born people 
lived in the U.S.  A decade later, that population more than doubled to 9.75 million, and in 2008 it 
peaked at 12.67 million.  About 11% of all Mexicans now live in the U.S.  About 5.7 million were able 
to get some kind of visa, but another 7 million couldn’t, and came nevertheless.  
 
People were migrating from Mexico to the U.S. long before NAFTA was negotiated.  Juan Manuel 
Sandoval emphasizes that “Mexican labor has always been linked to the different stages of U.S. 
capitalist development since the 19th century – in times of prosperity, by the incorporation of big 
numbers of workers in agricultural, manufacturing, service and other sectors, and in periods of 
economic crisis, by the deportation of Mexican laborers back to Mexico in huge numbers.”  The 
current wave of deportations – one million people in the last two years – bears him out.
From 1982 through the NAFTA era, successive economic reforms produced more migrants.  The 
displacement of people had already grown so large by 1986 that the commission established by IRCA 
was charged with recommending measures to halt or slow it.
 
Its report urged that “migrant-sending countries should encourage technological modernization by 
strengthening and assuring intellectual property protection and by removing existing impediments 
to investment” and recommended that “the United States should condition bilateral aid to sending 
countries on their taking the necessary steps toward structural adjustment. Similarly, U.S. support for 
non-project lending by the international financial institutions should be based on the implementation 
of satisfactory adjustment programs.”   The IRCA commission report even acknowledged the 
potential for harm by noting “efforts should be made to ease transitional costs in human suffering.”
 
The North American Free Trade Agreement, however, was not intended to relieve human suffering.  
In 1994, the year the treaty took effect, U.S. speculators began selling off Mexican government 
bonds.  According to Jeff Faux, founding director of the Economic Policy Institute, “the peso crash 
of December, 1994, was directly connected to NAFTA, which had created a speculative bubble for 
Mexican assets that then collapsed when the speculators cashed in.”  
“It is the financial crashes and the economic disasters that drive people to work for dollars in the U.S., 
to replace life savings, or just to earn enough to keep their family at home together,” says Harvard 
historian John Womack.  “The debt-induced crash in the 1980s, before NAFTA, drove people north...
The financial crash and the Rubin-induced reform of NAFTA, New York’s financial expropriation 
of Mexican finances between 1995 and 2000, drove the economically wrecked, dispossessed and 
impoverished north again.”
The U.S. immigration debate has no vocabulary that describes what happens to migrants before 
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they cross borders – the factors that force them into motion.  In the U.S. political debate, Veracruz’ 
uprooted coffee pickers or unemployed workers from Mexico City are called immigrants, because 
that debate doesn’t recognize their existence before they leave Mexico. It would be more accurate 
to call them migrants, and the process migration, since that takes into account both people’s 
communities of origin and those where they travel to find work.  
Displacement itself becomes an unmentionable word in the Washington discourse.  Not one 
immigration proposal in Congress in the quarter century since IRCA was passed tried to come to 
grips with the policies that uprooted miners, teachers, tree planters and farmers, in spite of the 
fact that Congress members voted for these policies.  In fact, while debating bills to criminalize 
undocumented migrants and set up huge guest worker programs, four new trade agreements were 
introduced, each of which would cause more displacement and more migration.  
Matamoros, Tamaulipas, Mexico -- A boy 
jumps over a polluted canal on his way to 
cross the border.
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Increasing Reliance on Guest Worker Programs
Over the last 25 years, guest worker programs have increasingly become a vehicle for channeling this 
migration.   Increasing numbers of guest workers are recruited each year for labor in the U.S. from 
Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean under the H1-B, H2-A and H2-B programs.  Recruiters 
promise high wages and charge thousands of dollars for visas, fees and transportation.  By the time 
they leave home, the debts of guest workers are crushing.  
In 2007 the Southern Poverty Law Center issued a report, Close to Slavery, documenting the 
treatment of guest workers.  No one gets overtime, regardless of the law.  Companies charge for 
tools, food and housing.  Guest workers are routinely cheated.  Recent protests have exposed the 
exploitation of guest workers recruited from India to work in the Mississippi shipyard of Signal 
International.  They paid $15-20,000 for each visa, lived in barracks in the yard, and had to get up at 
3.30 to use the bathroom because there weren’t enough for everyone.  The company cut the wages, 
held six workers prisoner for deportation, and fired their leader, Joseph Jacobs.  In 2006 Santiago 
Rafael Cruz, an organizer for the Farm Labor Organizing Committee, was murdered when the union 
tried to set up an office in Mexico to end the corruption and abuse by guest worker contractors.
If workers protest this treatment, they’re put on a blacklist and won’t be hired the following year.  
Protesting wouldn’t do much good anyway.  Prior to the current administration, the U.S. Department 
of Labor almost never decertified a guest worker contractor, no matter how many complaints were 
filed against it.  The paper industry depends on this system.  Twenty years ago, it stopped hiring 
unemployed workers domestically, and began recruiting guest workers.  As a result, labor costs in the 
forests have remained flat, while paper profits have gone up.
U.S. guest worker programs in general are just one part of a much larger, global system, which 
produces labor and then puts it to use.  In Latin America, economic reforms promoted by the U.S. 
government through trade agreements and international financial institutions displace workers, 
from miners to coffee pickers.  They then join a huge flood of labor moving north. When they arrive 
in the U.S., they become an indispensable part of the workforce, whether they are undocumented or 
laboring under work visas.  Displacement creates a mobile workforce, an army of available workers 
that has become an indispensable part of the U.S. economy, and that of wealthy countries like it.  The 
same system that produces migration needs and uses that labor.  
The creation of a vulnerable workforce through the displacement of communities is not new.  Africa 
became “a warren for the hunting of black skins” during the bloody displacement of communities by 
the slave traders.  Uprooted African farmers were transported to the Americas in chains, where they 
became an enslaved plantation workforce from Colombia and Brazil to the U.S. south.  Their labor 
created the wealth that made economic growth possible in the U.S. and much of Latin America and 
the Caribbean.  But displacement and enslavement produced more than wealth.  As slave-owners 
sought to differentiate slaves from free people, they created the first racial categories.  Society was 
divided into those with greater and fewer rights, using skin color and origin.  When anti-immigrant 
ideologues call modern migrants “illegals,” they use a category inherited and developed from 
slavery.  
Today displacement and inequality are as deeply ingrained in the free market economy as they were 
during the slave trade.  Mexican President Felipe Calderon said during a 2008 visit to California, 
“You have two economies. One economy is intensive in capital, which is the American economy. 
One economy is intensive in labor, which is the Mexican economy. We are two complementary 
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economies, and that phenomenon is impossible to stop.”  When Calderon says intensive in labor, he 
means that millions of Mexican citizens are being displaced, and that the country’s economy can’t 
produce employment for them.  To Calderon and employers on both sides of the U.S./Mexico border, 
migration is therefore a labor supply system. 
U.S. immigration policy determines the rules under which that labor is put to use.  Employers see 
migrants as a source of  labor, and seek to organize the flow of migration, to direct it where it’s 
needed.   “The economic interests of the overwhelming majority of [U.S.] employers favor borders as 
porous for labor as possible,” according to Faux.  But employers want labor in a vulnerable, second-
class status, at a price they want to pay.
President George Bush said the purpose of U.S. immigration policy should be to “connect willing 
employers and willing employees.”  He was simply restating what has been true throughout U.S. 
history.  Providing labor is the reason Chinese migrants were brought from the Pearl River delta to 
build the transcontinental railroad in the 1850s. Providing labor was the motivation for the slave 
trade.  In the 1920s and 30s Filipinos were kept moving from labor camp to labor camp, while anti-
miscegenation laws kept them from settling down and forming families.  They, too, provided labor, as 
did those Mexican farmers brought to the U.S. during the bracero contract labor program, from 1942 
to 1964.
 
U.S., industrial agriculture has always depended on a migrant workforce, formed from waves of 
Chinese, Japanese, Filipinos, Mexicans, and more recently, Central Americans.  Today a growing 
percentage of farm workers are indigenous people speaking languages other than Spanish, an 
indication that economic dislocation has reached far into the most remote parts of Mexico’s 
countryside. 
 
Within this system of displacement and migration, U.S. immigration policy determines the status 
of migrant labor.   It doesn’t stop people from coming into the country, nor is it intended to.  Its 
main function is to determine the status of people once they’re here.  And an immigration policy 
based on providing a labor supply produces two effects.  Displacement becomes an unspoken tool 
for producing workers, while inequality becomes official policy.  The unquestioned assumption is 
that migrants will not have the same rights as people living in the community around them.  All the 
immigration bills debated by Congress over the last few years are based on this assumption. 
Today, calling someone an “illegal” doesn’t refer to an illegal act.  Illegality is a social category.  
Illegality creates an inexpensive system.  So-called illegal workers produce wealth, but receive a 
smaller share in return – a source of profit for those who employ them.  Inequality is profitable.  In 
1994 the labor of undocumented workers pumped $45,000 per person into the California economy 
according to the North American Integration and Development Center at UCLA.  Assuming almost 
all were working at close to the minimum wage, each received only a small part of the value he or 
she produced, about $8840 each.  The average manufacturing wage at the time produced an annual 
income more than twice that.  That additional value was expropriated by employers.
Companies depend, not just on the workers in the factories and fields, but also on the communities 
from which they come.  If those communities stop sending workers, the labor supply dries up.  Work 
stops.  Yet no company pays for a single school or clinic, or even any taxes, in those communities.  
Workers pay for it all, through the money they send home.  
About 11 percent of Mexico’s population lives in the U.S., according to the Pew Hispanic Center.   
Their remittances, which were less than $4 billion in 1994 when NAFTA took effect, rose to $10 billion 
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in 2002, and then $20 billion three years later, according to the Bank of Mexico.  In 2006 that figure 
reached $25 billion. At the same time, the public funds which used to pay for schools and public 
works leaves Mexico in debt payments to foreign banks.  Remittances, as large as they are, cannot 
make up for this outflow.  According to a report to the Mexican Chamber of Deputies, remittances 
accounted for an average of 1.19% of the gross domestic product between1996 and 2000, and 2.14% 
between 2001 and 2006.  Debt payments accounted for 3% annually.  By partially meeting unmet, and 
unfunded, social needs, remittances are indirectly subsidizing banks.
At the same time, companies dependent on this immigrant stream gain greater flexibility in 
adjusting for the highs and lows of market demand. The global production system has grown very 
flexible in accommodating economic booms and busts.  Its employment system is based on the 
use of contractors, which is replacing the system in which workers were directly employed by the 
businesses using their labor.  This has been the employment model in the garment and janitorial 
industries and in agriculture for decades.  Displaced migrant workers are the backbone of this 
system.  Its guiding principle 
is that immigration policy and 
enforcement should direct 
immigrants to industries when their 
labor is needed, and remove them 
when it’s not. 
Guest worker and employment-
based visa programs were created 
to accommodate labor needs.  
When demand is high, employers 
recruit workers.  When demand 
falls, those workers not only have 
to leave their jobs, but the country 
entirely.  
Today employers call for relaxing 
the requirements on guest 
worker visas, especially since 
those protections have recently 
been strengthened by the current 
Secretary of Labor, Hilda Solis.  
Simply putting more labor 
protections on the programs does 
not change their basic structure that 
makes those workers vulnerable.  
“They don’t have labor rights or 
benefits,” Dominguez charges.  “It’s 
like slavery.  If workers don’t get 
paid or they’re cheated, they can’t 
do anything.”
Graton, California -- Rafael Cis-
neros, an H-A worker, looks at a 
photo of his son, who he left be-
hind in Mexico to work in the U.S.
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Labor Programs and Greater Enforcement – 
The Corporate Agenda on Immigration
The meatpacking industry started lobbying for guest workers in the late 1990s, when companies 
organized the Essential Worker Immigration Coalition – corporations like Wal-Mart, Marriott, Tyson 
Foods and the Associated Builders and Contractors.   While Republicans are strong guest worker 
supporters, the proposals in Congress are bipartisan, supported by liberals like Senator Edward 
Kennedy and Congressman Luis Gutierrez.  
New guest worker programs are the heart of the corporate program for immigration reform, and are 
combined with proposals for increased enforcement and a pro-employer program for legalization of 
the undocumented.  Guest worker proposals, advanced now even at the negotiations of the World 
Trade Organization, have two characteristics.  They allow employers to recruit labor in one country 
and put it to use in another, and they tie the ability of workers to stay in their new country to their 
employment status.  If they aren’t working, they have no right to stay.  These inevitably lead to a 
different social, political and economic status, in which workers don’t have the same rights as those 
around them, and can’t receive the same social benefits.  
Some bills in the U.S. Congress in recent years would have allowed some of the largest corporations 
to recruit and bring into the country, through labor contractors, as many as 800,000 people a year.  
And in the middle of the final debate in 2006 in which his proposal failed, President George Bush 
tried to eliminate all family-based immigration, and allow people to come to the U.S. only when 
recruited by employers.  Under his proposal almost all immigrants would have become guest 
workers.  Significantly, however, the general three-part approach of the Obama administration’s 
immigration reform program is not significantly different from that of his predecessor.
A second element in the corporate program is legalization, but in a program tailored more to protect 
employers from legal charges for hiring undocumented workers than helping families adjust their 
status.  Congress’ comprehensive bills all would have imposed waiting periods from 11 to 18 years 
on immigrants applying for legalization, during which time they would be as vulnerable as ever.  But 
their employers would be protected from charges they’d violated employer sanctions, while they 
organized the recruitment of new workers through guest worker programs.
Because of the record of abuse of guest worker programs, and because working outside those 
programs offers an attractive alternative, the third necessary element of this kind of corporate reform 
in an increase in enforcement against undocumented labor in the workplace, and unauthorized 
border crossing.  These proposals seek to end spontaneous migration, in which people decide for 
themselves when to come and where to go, by making it impossible to work without a work visa 
and contract.  In its place they substitute a regimented system in which people can only migrate as 
contracted labor. 
After the big immigrant rights marches of 2006 the Federal government launched a dramatic increase 
in raids in workplaces and communities. Spokespeople for the bureau of Customs and Immigration 
Enforcement (ICE), a division of the Federal Department of Homeland Security (DHS), explained 
they were intended to show the need for the administration’s immigration program. ICE also began 
to implement many of the enforcement measures contained in the reform bills Congress didn’t pass.
In 2007 then-Homeland Secretary Michael Chertoff proposed a rule requiring employers to fire any 
worker who couldn’t correct a mismatch between the Social Security number they’ provided their 
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employer, and the SSA database. The regulation assumes those workers have no valid immigration 
visa.  That regulation was challenged in federal court by unions and immigrant advocates.  But the 
Obama administration has simply implemented the same scheme using different tactics.  
Recently the Council on Foreign Relations proposed two goals for U.S. immigration policy.  In a 
report from the CFR-sponsored Independent Task Force on U.S. Immigration Policy, CFR Senior 
Fellow Edward Alden stated,  “We should reform the legal immigration system,” it advocated, “so 
that it operates more efficiently, responds more accurately to labor market needs, and enhances 
U.S. competitiveness.”  This essentially calls for continuing use of migration to supply labor at 
competitive, or low, wages. “We should restore the integrity of immigration laws,” Aiden went on 
to say, “through an enforcement regime that strongly discourages employers and employees from 
operating outside that legal system.”  This couples an enforcement regime like the one at present, 
with its raids and firings, to that labor supply scheme. 
For two years dozens of other employers have fired workers in response to demands from ICE, the 
enforcement arm of the Department of Homeland Security.  ICE chief  John Morton made serial 
announcements of the number of companies being audited to find undocumented employees – citing 
figures from 1000 to 1654.  Many thousands of workers have lost their jobs.  In Minneapolis, Seattle 
and San Francisco over 1800 janitors, members of SEIU union locals, lost their jobs.  In 2009 some 2000 
young women laboring at the sewing machines of American Apparel were fired in Los Angeles.  At 
one point Morton claimed ICE had audited over 2900 companies.
 
President Obama says this workplace enforcement targets employers “who are using illegal 
workers in order to drive down wages—and oftentimes mistreat those workers.”  An ICE Worksite 
Enforcement Advisory claims “unscrupulous employers are likely to pay illegal workers substandard 
wages or force them to endure intolerable working conditions.”  Curing intolerable conditions 
by firing workers who endure them doesn’t help the workers or change the conditions, however.  
Instead, the administration’s rhetoric has fed efforts to blame immigrants for “stealing jobs” and for 
undermining wages. 
The DHS workplace enforcement wave is focusing, not on low-wage employers, but on high-
wage, and often unionized ones.  There is a long history of anti-union animus among immigration 
authorities.  Agents have set up roadblocks before union elections in California fields, conducted 
raids during meatpacking organizing drives in North Carolina and Iowa, audited janitorial employers 
and airline food plants prior to union contract negotiations, and helped companies terminate close to 
a thousand apple packers when they tried to join the Teamsters Union in Washington state.  
Unscrupulous employers use their vulnerability to deny undocumented workers the minimum wage 
or overtime, and to fire workers when they protest or organize.  This affects workers in general.  After 
deporting over 1000 employees of Swift meatpacking plants, former Homeland Security Secretary 
Chertoff called for linking “effective interior enforcement and a temporary-worker program.’’  The 
government is again giving a cheap labor subsidy to large employers.  Deportations, firings and guest 
worker programs all make labor cheaper and union organizing harder.
Meanwhile, some states and local communities, seeing a green light from the Department of 
Homeland Security, have passed measures that go even further.  The Arizona legislature has passed a 
law requiring employers to verify the immigration status of every worker through a federal database 
called E-Verify, and fire workers whose names get flagged.  It then passed a law, SB 1070, requiring 
police to check the immigration status of all people they stop on the street.  Mississippi passed a bill 
making it a felony for an undocumented worker to hold a job, with jail time of 1-10 years, fines of up 
to $10,000 and no bail for anyone arrested.  States like Georgia and Alabama have passed bills even 
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more repressive than Arizona’s.  Congress itself has passed bills requiring similar use of the E-Verify 
database, which were supported by both political parties.  
Workplace raids and firings are part of an overall program for increasing immigration enforcement.  
One of its most bitterly-fought elements is the growing connection between police departments 
and immigration authorities.  Under President Bush, the federal government began implementing 
“287g” agreements, under which local police departments shared information and turned over to 
immigration agents people arrested for even minor traffic violations.  Those agreements then were 
codified in a federal program called “Secure Communities.”  At first, ICE tried to sign agreements 
with state and local law enforcement bodies, requiring them to turn over the fingerprints of anyone 
with whom they came into contact.  The Obama administration claimed that it was only seeking 
criminals for deportation.
In practice, however, this increased cooperation led to the detention of hundreds of thousands of 
immigrants with no criminal record, who were held simply because they were undocumented.  
Deportations skyrocketed.  Over a million people have been deported from the U.S. as a result of all 
this combined enforcement since Obama took office.  When even some states tried to pull out of the 
program, the Department of Homeland Security announced that it didn’t need their agreement, and 
would continue expanding the program with or without them.  A rising wave of protest has met this 
declaration, as the wave of deportations has grown.  In response to criticism, the administration has 
called for the passage of “comprehensive immigration reform” as its alternative to criminalization 
and mass removals – essentially using blackmail and repression to advance the corporate 
immigration reform program.
Emeryville, California -- Luz Dominguez, fired 
from her hotel job because she had no papers.
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The Modern Immigrant Rights Movement
Before the cold war, the defense of the rights of immigrants in the U.S., especially those from Mexico, 
Central America and Asia was mounted mostly by immigrant working class communities, and the 
alliances they built with the left wing of the U.S. labor movement.  At the time when the left came 
under attack and was partly destroyed in the cold war, immigrant rights leaders were also targeted 
for deportation.  Meanwhile, U.S. immigration policy became more overtly a labor supply scheme 
than at any other time in its history.  
In the 1950s, at the height of the cold war, the combination of enforcement and contract labor reached 
a peak.  In 1954 1,075,168 Mexicans were deported from the U.S.  And from 1956 to 1959, between 
432,491 and 445,197 Mexicans were brought into the U.S. each year on temporary work visas, in what 
was known as the “bracero” program.  The program, begun during World War Two, in 1942, was 
finally abolished in 1964.  
 
The civil rights movement ended the bracero program, and created an alternative to the deportation 
regime.  Chicano activists of the 1960s - Ernesto Galarza, Cesar Chávez, Bert Corona, Dolores Huerta 
and others - convinced Congress in 1964 to repeal Public Law 78, the law authorizing the bracero 
program.  Farm workers went on strike the year after in Delano, California, and the United Farm 
Workers was born.  They also helped to convince Congress in 1965 to pass immigration legislation 
that established new pathways for legal immigration - the family preference system.  People could 
reunite their families in the U.S.  Migrants received permanent residency visas, allowing them to live 
normal lives, and enjoy basic human and labor rights.  Essentially, a family- and community-oriented 
system replaced the old labor supply/deportation program.
Then, under pressure from employers in the late 1970s, Congress began to debate the bills that 
eventually resulted in the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act.  That debate set in place the 
basic dividing line in the modern immigrant rights movement.  IRCA contained three elements.  It 
reinstituted a bracero-like guest worker program, by setting up the H2-A visa category.  It penalized 
employers who hired undocumented workers (“employer sanctions”), and required them to check 
the immigration status of every worker.  And it set up an amnesty process for undocumented workers 
in the country before 1982.  
The main trade union federation to which most U.S. unions belong, the American Federation of 
Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), supported sanctions, saying they’d stop 
undocumented immigration (and therefore, presumably, job competition with citizen or legal resident 
workers).  The Catholic Church and other Washington DC liberal advocates supported amnesty 
and were willing to agree to guest workers and enforcement as a tradeoff.  Employers wanted guest 
worker programs. The bill was opposed by immigrant communities and leftwing immigrant rights 
advocates , from the Centro de Acción Social Autónomo (CASA), founded in Los Angeles by labor 
and immigrant rights leader Bert Corona, to the Bay Area Committee Against Simpson Mazzoli in 
Northern California, and similar groups around the country.  Local labor activists and leaders also 
opposed the bill, but were not strong enough to change labor’s position nationally.   The Washington 
DC-based coalition produced the votes in Congress, and Ronald Reagan, one of the country’s most 
conservative presidents, signed the bill into law.
Once the bill had passed, many of the local organizations that had opposed it set up community-
based coalitions to deal with the bill’s impact.  In Los Angeles, with the country’s largest 
concentration of undocumented Mexican and Central American workers, pro-immigrant labor 
activists set up centers to help people apply for amnesty.  That effort, together with earlier, mostly 
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left-led campaigns to organize undocumented workers, built the base for the later upsurge of 
immigrants that changed the politics and labor movement of the city.  Elsewhere, local immigrant 
advocates set up coalitions to look for ways to defend undocumented workers against the impact 
of employer sanctions.  Grass roots coalitions then began helping workers set up centers for day 
laborers, garment workers, domestic workers, and other groups of immigrants generally ignored by 
established unions.
Over the 27 years since IRCA, a general division has marked the U.S. immigrant rights movement.  
On one side are well-financed advocacy organizations in Washington DC, with links to the 
Democratic Party and large corporations.  They formulate and negotiate over immigration 
reform proposals that combine labor supply programs and increased enforcement against the 
undocumented.  On the other 
side are organizations based in 
immigrant communities, and 
among labor and political activists, 
who defend undocumented 
migrants, and who resist proposals 
for greater enforcement and labor 
programs with diminished rights.  
In the late 1990s, when the Clinton 
administration acquiesced in efforts 
to pass repressive immigration 
legislation (what eventually 
became the Immigration Reform 
And Immigrant Responsibility 
Act), Washington lobbying groups 
advocated a strategy to allow 
measures directed at increasing 
deportations of the undocumented 
to pass (calling them 
“unstoppable”) while mounting 
a defense only of legally resident 
immigrants.  Many community-
based coalitions withdrew from 
the Washington lobbying efforts, 
refusing to cast the undocumented 
to the wolves.  The strategy failed, 
in any case, and the eventual law 
includes severe provisions directed 
at legal, as well as undocumented 
immigrants.
In the labor movement, the growing 
strength of immigrant workers, 
combined with a commitment to 
organize those industries where 
they were concentrated, created the 
base for changing labor’s position.  
At the 1999 AFL-CIO convention in Los Angeles, 
Los Angeles, California -- Bert Corona, hero 
of the U.S. immigrant rights movement.
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the federation called for the repeal of employer sanctions, for a new amnesty, and for defending the 
labor rights of all workers.  The federation was already opposed to guest worker programs.  That 
position was maintained by the AFL-CIO, even after several unions left to form the rival Change to 
Win federation, until 2009.  At that time, a compromise was reached between the two federations, 
in which they dropped their previous opposition to employer sanctions, so long as they were 
implemented “fairly.”
In the years between 2003 and 2009, a succession of “comprehensive” immigration reform bills were 
introduced into Congress.  At their heart are the guest worker programs proposed by employers.  But 
while the employer lobbies wrote the first bills, they’ve been supported by a political coalition that 
includes some unions (especially the Service Employees), lobbying groups like the National Council 
of La Raza and the American Immigration Lawyers Association, and the top hierarchy of the Catholic 
Church.  Except for the vacillating and divided position of unions, this is the same political coalition 
that passed IRCA in 1986.  
Some local immigrant rights coalitions have also supported the bills, although most have 
been unwilling to agree to guest worker programs and more enforcement.  Supporters of the 
comprehensive bills have organized a succession of high-profile lobbying efforts, which have received 
extensive foundation support.  Those coalitions have included the National Immigration Forum, 
the Fair Immigration Reform Movement, and Reform Immigration for America.  While the names 
have changed, the organizations at the heart have stayed constant.  The structure of the bills has 
been basically the same from the beginning – the same three-part structure of IRCA – guest workers, 
enforcement and some degree of legalization.
Over the last decade, however, a loose, unorganized network of groups has grown that has generally 
opposed most CIR bills and their provisions, and that have also organized the movements on 
the ground that have opposed increased enforcement and repression directed against immigrant 
communities.  Outside the Washington beltway, community coalitions, labor and immigrant 
rights groups are advocating alternatives.  Some of them are large-scale counters to the entire CIR 
framework.  Others seek to win legal status for a part of the undocumented population, as a step 
towards larger change.  
One of those proposals is the Dream Act.  First introduced in 2003, the bill would allow 
undocumented students graduating from a U.S. high school to apply for permanent residence if they 
complete two years of college or serve two years in the U.S. military.  Estimates are that it would 
enable over 800,000 young people to gain legal status, and eventual citizenship.  For seven years 
thousands of young “sin papeles,” or people without papers, have marched, sat-in, written letters 
and mastered every civil rights tactic to get their bill onto the Washington DC agenda.
 
Many of them have “come out” -- declaring openly their lack of legal immigration status in media 
interviews, defying authorities to detain them.  Three were arrested when they sat-in at the office 
of Arizona Senator John McCain, demanding that he support the bill, while defying immigration 
authorities to come get them.   The DREAM Act campaigners did than get a vote in Washington.  
They learned to stop deportations  in an era when more people have been deported than ever since 
the days of the Cold War.
When it was originally written, the bill would have allowed young people to qualify for legalization 
with 900 hours of community service, as an alternative to attending college, which many can’t afford.  
However, when the bill was introduced, the Pentagon pressured to substitute military for community 
service.  Many young activists were torn by this provision, and ultimately, the bill did not pass 
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Congress, even with that change.  Nevertheless, many immigrant rights activists view the DREAM 
Act as an important step towards a more basic reform of the country’s immigration laws. 
Supporting the Dream Act and other partial protections for the undocumented are the worker centers 
around the country.   This movement is based on organizing centers for contingent workers, who are 
mostly undocumented.  Some of the centers have anchored the protests against repression in Arizona, 
or fought to pass laws in California, New York and elsewhere prohibiting police from turning over 
people to immigration agents.  They’ve especially developed grassroots models for organizing 
migrants who get jobs on street corners, and these projects have come together in the National Day 
Labor Organizing Network.  The National Domestic Worker Alliance was organized last year, in part 
using the experience of day labor organizing, to win rights for domestic workers, almost all of whom 
are women.  It won passage of a bill of  rights in New York, and is working on passing it in California.
On a broader scale, what would be a law that would liberate people, not turn them into modern day 
slaves today?  Many progressive 
immigrant rights organizations 
have sought to formulate an answer 
to this question, especially in 
response to the CIR proposals in 
Washington that they oppose.  
The Frente Indigena de 
Organizaciones Binacionales 
(Binational Front of Indigenous 
Organizations – FIOB) conducted 
a series of organized discussions 
among its California chapters 
to formulate a very progressive 
position on immigration reform, 
with the unique perspective of 
an organization of migrants and 
migrant-sending communities.  
Because of its indigenous 
membership, FIOB campaigns for 
the rights of migrants in the U.S. 
-- for immigration amnesty and 
legalization for undocumented 
Santiago Juxtlahuaca, Oaxaca, 
Mexico -- Indigenous farmers 
protest the impact of NAFTA.
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migrants -- while also condemning proposals for guest worker programs.  At the same time, “we 
need development that makes migration a choice rather than a necessity -- the right to not migrate,” 
explains Gaspar Rivera Salgado, FIOB’s binational coordinator.  “Both rights are part of the same 
solution.  We have to change the debate from one in which immigration is presented as a problem to a 
debate over rights.  The real problem is exploitation.”   This perspective is especially important in the 
U.S., where those debating immigration policy need  to hear the voices of Mexicans, especially on the 
left, as they discuss the movement of people back and forth across the border.  
The FIOB proposal on immigration reform is similar to that advanced by the Dignity Campaign, 
a loose coalition of organizations around the country that have proposed an alternative to 
the comprehensive (labor supply plus enforcement) bills.  The constituent organizations have 
participated in other earlier coalitions opposing employer sanctions and guest worker programs.  
The Dignity Campaign brings together immigrant rights and fair trade organizations, to encourage 
each to see the global connections between trade policy, displacement and migration.  It also brings 
together unions and immigrant rights organizations to spur the growth of a fightback against 
immigration enforcement against workers, highlighting the need to oppose the criminalization of 
work.
The Dignity Campaign proposal draws on previous efforts, particularly one put forward by the 
American Friends Service Committee called “A New Path,” -- a set of moral principles for changing 
U.S. immigration policy.  Important contributions were made by several other organizations.  Filipino 
Advocates for Justice, based in northern California’s Filipino community, has its roots in the student 
civil rights protests and anti-discrimination fights defending Filipino workers.  It anchored the 
movement to gain veteran status and benefits for Filipino veterans of World War 2, and is one of the 
leaders of the Domestic Workers Alliance in California.  It also anchors the Dignity Campaign.
The Mississippi Immigrants Rights Alliance, one of the only community-based immigrant rights 
coalitions initiated and organized by African Americans, has defeated dozens of anti-immigrant bills 
over the last several years.  Through the Black Caucus in the state legislature, it has concentrated on 
developing a political alliance between African Americans and immigrants, has opposed immigration 
raids, and has fought for the rights of guest workers brought into the Gulf coast for reconstruction 
work after Hurricane Katrina.  In contributed to the Dignity Campaign important proposals based 
on finding common ground between immigrants and communities, especially African American 
ones, with high unemployment.  These efforts coincide with a proposal by Houston Congresswoman 
Sheila Jackson Lee to pass an immigration reform combining legalization for the undocumented with 
Federal job creation and job training programs.
Community2Community in northern Washington State is based in rural farm worker communities.  
It has opposed enforcement efforts in immigrant communities close to the northern border, including 
the abuse of immigrants by the Border Patrol.  It is headed by Rosalinda Guillén, who spearheaded 
the union organizing of farm workers in the state, today it sets up rural cooperatives.
This is not in any way meant to be a list of all grassroots or community based organizations that have 
advocated a progressive vision of immigrant rights, but to highlight some of the key players, and 
show the diversity of the groups involved.
The critique shared by all these organizations contends that the CIR framework ignores trade 
agreements like NAFTA and CAFTA, which produce profits for U.S. corporations, but increase 
poverty in Mexico and Central America.  Without changing U.S. trade policy and ending structural 
adjustment programs and neoliberal economic reforms, millions of displaced people will continue to 

come, no matter how many walls are built on the border.
Under the “comprehensive immigration reform” (CIR) proposals promoted by Washington DC 
advocacy groups for several years, some of which were introduced as bills into Congress, people 
working without papers would continue to be fired and even imprisoned and raids would increase.  
Vulnerability makes it harder for people to defend their rights, organize unions and raise wages.  That 
keeps the price of immigrant labor low.  This will not stop people from coming to the U.S., but it will 
produce a much larger detention system.  Last year over 350,000 people went through privately-run 
prisons for undocumented immigrants.  At the same time, the Washington DC-based CIR proposals 
all expand guest worker programs, in which workers would have few rights, and no leverage to 
organize for better conditions.  Finally, the CIR legalization measures would impose barriers making 
ineligible many of the 12 million people who need legal status.  They condition legalization on 
“securing the border,” which has become a Washington DC euphemism for a heavy military presence 
augmenting 20,000 Border Patrol agents, creating a climate of wholesale denial of civil and human 
rights in border communities.
“The governments of both Mexico and the U.S. are dependent on the cheap labor of Mexicans.  They 
don’t say so openly, but they are,” Domínguez concludes. “What would improve our situation is 
legal status for the people already here, and greater availability of visas based on family reunification. 
Legalization and more visas would resolve a lot of problems – not all, but it would be a big step,” 
he says.  “Walls won’t stop migration, but decent wages and investing money in creating jobs in our 
countries of origin would decrease the pressure forcing us to leave home.  Penalizing us by making it 
illegal for us to work won’t stop migration, since it doesn’t deal with why people come.” 
Changing corporate trade policy and stopping neoliberal reforms is as central to immigration reform 
as gaining legal status for undocumented immigrants.  It makes no sense to promote more free trade 
agreements, and then condemn the migration of the people they displace.  Instead, Congress must 
end the use of the free trade system as a mechanism for producing displaced workers.  That also 
means delinking immigration status and employment.  If employers are allowed to recruit contract 
labor abroad, and those workers can only stay if they are continuously employed, then they will 
never have enforceable rights.
The root problem with migration in the global economy is that it’s forced migration.  A coalition 
for reform should fight for the right of people to choose when and how to migrate.  Freedom of 
movement is a human right.  Even in a more just world, migration will continue, because families 
and communities are now connected over thousands of miles and many borders.  Immigration policy 
should therefore make movement easier.
At the same time, workers need basic rights, regardless of immigration status.  It would be better 
to devote more resources to enforcing labor standards for all workers, instead of penalizing 
undocumented workers for working, and employers for hiring them.  “Otherwise,” Domínguez says, 
“wages will be depressed in a race to the bottom, since if one employer has an advantage, others will 
seek the same thing.”
To raise the low price of immigrant labor, immigrant workers have to be able to organize.  Permanent 
legal status makes it easier to organize.  Guest worker programs, employer sanctions, enforcement 
and raids make organizing much more difficult. Today the section of workers with no benefits and 
the lowest wages is expanding the fastest.  Proposals to deny people rights or benefits because of 
immigration status make this process move even faster.  A popular coalition should push back in the 
other direction, toward more equal status, which will help unite diverse communities. 
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Building a political coalition for a more pro-worker and pro-immigrant reform has to start by seeking 
mutual interest among workers.  That common ground is a struggle for jobs and rights for everyone.  
Black unemployment, for instance, is at catastrophic levels.  Very little unemployment is a result of 
displacement by immigrants, and is caused mostly by the decline in manufacturing and cuts in public 
employment.  In the 2001 recession 300,000 out of 2,000,000 Black factory workers lost their jobs.   But 
in the growing service and high tech industries, displaced African American and Chicano workers are 
anathema.  Employers think they’re too pro-union.  They demand high wages the companies don’t 
want to pay.  
It’s not possible to win major changes in immigration policy without making them part of a struggle 
for the goals of African Americans, unions and working-class communities.  To end job competition, 
for instance, workers need Congress to adopt a full-employment policy.  To gain organizing rights 
for immigrants, all workers need the Employee Free Choice Act and labor law reform.  Winning 
those demands requires an alliance between workers – immigrants and native-born, Latinos, African 
Americans, Asian Americans and whites.  An alliance with employers, giving them new guest worker 
programs, will increase job competition, push wages down, and make affirmative action impossible.  
The Dignity Campaign proposal, therefore, is not just an alternative program for changing laws and 
policies, but an implicit strategy of alliances among those communities and constituencies based on 
their mutual interest.  The basic elements of such an alternative include
* Giving permanent residence visas, or green cards, to undocumented people already here, and 
expanding the number of green cards available for new migrants. 
* Eliminating the years-long backlog in processing family reunification visas, strengthening families 
and communities.
* Allowing people to apply for green cards, in the future, after they’ve been living in the U.S. for a few 
years.  
* Ending the enforcement that has led to thousands of deportations and firings
* Repealing employer sanctions, and enforcing labor rights and worker protection laws, for all 
workers.
* Ending all guest worker programs
* Dismantling the border wall and demilitarizing the border, so more people don’t die crossing it, and 
restoring civil and human rights in border communities.
* Responding to recession and foreclosures with jobs programs to guarantee income, and remove the 
fear of job competition
* Redirecting the money spent on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan to rebuilding communities, 
refinancing mortgages, and restoring the social services needed by working families.  
* Renegotiating existing trade agreements to eliminate causes of displacement and prohibiting new 
trade agreements that displace people or lower living standards, including military intervention 
intended to enforce neoliberal reforms.
* Prohibiting local law enforcement agencies from enforcing immigration law, ending roadblocks, 
immigration raids and sweeps, and closing detention centers
There is no shortage of needed work in the U.S., but budget priorities must be changed to redirect 
resources to the areas that will produce jobs and increased well-being.  To resolve the dilemmas 
of migration and globalization, the U.S. needs a system that produces security, not insecurity.  
Corporations and those who benefit from current priorities might not support this alternative, but 
millions of people will.  

A new era of rights and equality for migrants won’t begin from Washington DC, any more than the 
civil rights movement did.  A human rights reform will be a product of the social movements of this 
country, especially of people on the bottom outside the beltway.  A social movement made possible 
advances in 1965 that were called unrealistic and politically impossible a decade earlier.  The Dignity 
Campaign proposal may not be a viable one in a Congress dominated by Tea Party nativists and 
corporations seeking guest worker programs.  But just as it took a civil rights movement to pass the 
Voting Rights Act, any basic change to establish the rights of immigrants will also require a social 
upheaval and a fundamental realignment of power.  
Kennett Square, Pennsylvania - On May Day, 00, 
immigrants and their supporters marched through 
the streets of a small town where thousands of im-
migrant workers labor in sheds growing mushrooms.  
Marchers protested anti-immigrant bills in Congress 
and local anti-immigrant initiatives.  Many called for 
amnesty -- permanent residence visas which would 
give the undocumented immediate legal status and 
rights -- and equality -- opposing second-class status 
as temporary workers.
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